After reunifying China in 1927, the Nationalist government proposed a comprehensive planning proposal, the Capital Plan (shoudu jihua), to reconstruct the war-torn city of Nanjing into a modern capital, despite the fact that the infant republic was still threatened by internal strife and external aggression. This article discusses the complex politics involved in the reconstruction of Nanjing from 1927 to 1937, illustrating the way in which the Nationalist state tried to transform China's urban development. It focuses on why unified planning ideas could not be generated during the planning process, and why these ideas did not turn fully into practice during the implementation process. By studying the aborted effort in planning Nanjing, knowing in what particular dimensions the state excelled and in what other dimensions things went wrong, this article analyzes the unevenness of state capacity in Republican China.
Introduction
After reunifying China in 1927, the Nationalist government proposed a comprehensive planning proposal, the Capital Plan (shoudu jihua, or SDJH), to reconstruct the war-torn city of Nanjing into a modern capital, despite the fact that the infant republic was still threatened by internal strife and external aggression. But in the end, the plan failed, for the most part. In this article, I try to identify the reasons that the Nationalist leaders committed to planning a new city and investing money and effort in reconstructing Nanjing even during a time of war and struggle. I discuss the complex politics involved in the reconstruction of Nanjing from 1927 Nanjing from to 1937 illustrating how the Nationalist state became a transformative force behind China's urban development. I evaluate the capacity of Republican China with regard to city planning in the face of unfavorable social, economic, and political circumstances through a discussion of the various factors that led to the premature abortion of the Capital Plan. In particular, I explore why a A number of scholars have studied the state-led reconstruction of Nanjing during the Republican era. Their studies usually fall into three main categories. The first category focuses on the importation of Western concepts and theories to Republican China. Jeffrey Cody and other scholars explain the American influence on both architectural design and city planning in Republican China. Such influence was created by architects and planners, both Chinese and foreign, who advocated the adaptation of traditional Chinese architecture for modern uses, often expressed in the convergence of Chinese traditional architecture and the French-derived methods of the Beaux-Arts (Cody 2001; Cody, Steinhardt, and Atkin 2011; Fu 1993 ). Luo Ling, on the other hand, illustrates how Western concepts influenced the basic process of development and change in Republican Nanjing, not only in architecture and city planning but also in urban governance, infrastructure, and commercial development (1999) . The second category is literature about nationalism and nation building. Charles D. Musgrove, for instance, examines the Nationalist state's effort in making Nanjing into a symbol of Chinese nationhood. By imposing ideological discourse to legitimize Nanjing as a new capital, using scientific methods to plan the city, and reinvesting meaning into urban spaces, the state created a "new cosmology" in Nanjing and a new idea of Chinese modernity (Musgrove 2000 (Musgrove , 2002 . One particularly important Nationalist project was the construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing. In his dissertation, Wang Chun-hsiung discusses the institutionalization of city planning in modern China with a detailed study of the background, interests, and conflicts of the Nationalist bureaucrats and planners (2002) . Given the strong technocratic background of the Nationalist
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leadership, William Kirby argues that the statist ideology of Republican China was in fact "industrial modernity," as evidenced by the state's enthusiasm in engineering the capital Nanjing (2000) . Overall, literature in these three categories helps us to understand the Nationalists' vision of modernity, and the symbolism, monumentality, and developmentalism the Nationalist state sought to invest in the new national capital. Nevertheless, the reasons why many state-led reconstruction projects in Nanjing were aborted prematurely have received far less attention. By comparing the proposed Capital Plan with the actual outcomes, this article analyzes the uneven capacity of the Nationalist state in different dimensions of the planning and implementation process.
This article is divided into three sections. The first section explores the larger political reasons behind the reconstruction of Nanjing, showing why the Nationalist government was so enthusiastic about city planning even during times of struggle. I discuss the capacity of the Nationalist state in the planning and implementation processes respectively. In the second section, I analyze the concerns, interests, competency, and reactions of the Nationalist leaders and planners involved during the planning process. In the last section, I have selected three important projects under the Capital Plan-the central administrative zone, the residential zones, and the capital road networks-as case studies. I analyze how the unfavorable social, political, and economic conditions of the Republican era affected the ways that these three projects actually turned out.
Reconstructing Nanjing

Reclaiming the Revolutionary Legacy of Nanjing
Nanjing literally means "southern capital." The name refers to the city's glorious past as the imperial residence of the first Ming emperor. The city was protected by the Purple Mountain in the east, the Xuanwu Lake in the northeast, the Yangtze River in the northwest, and the Qinhuai River, which forms a natural moat in the south. The massive city wall, which still survives, was constructed in the fourteenth century. Shaped by the natural landscape, the city appears irregular, but the imperial city and the palace city of the Ming court were planned in a square shape in strict adherence to the imperial planning convention. another round of debate on the capital location. Some Nationalist leaders and foreign ministers laughed off the idea of moving the capital from Beijing to Nanjing, citing the total absence of accommodations and the expense of building new ministerial quarters in Nanjing as a distinct handicap. They speculated that it would take twelve to eighteen months to design and construct the necessary government buildings, which would easily cause chaos in the infant republic (Impev 1928, 233 ). An unnamed high official of the Nationalist government summarized in an interview three reasons why Beijing should be picked ahead of Nanjing:
First, the matter of modern government buildings, hotels and residences, none of which are possessed by Nanking; second, the element of Chinese political influence in Manchuria and Mongolia, both of which territories are fighting ground between Japan, Russia and China. If the Capital is removed to Nanking it is likely to cause a weakening of Chinese political influence in those areas which might be disastrous from the future standpoint of the political unity of the country; and third, the fact that the Powers have their Legations in Peking. Despite the unequal treaty situation, it is vital that China should maintain the closest possible relations with the Powers because China will need the assistance of the foreigners for many years to come. And what about Chiang Kai-shek? His fate is very uncertain. He will last as long as his prestige lasts. He has a good number of political enemies who are only too anxious to undermine his prestige and see his downfall. It is, of course, to his advantage that [Nanjing] remains the centre of administration and that at least holds the purse. (Tsok 1928, 53) This comment reflected a common doubt at that time: would Chiang Kai-shek and his
Republican regime last long? On a national level, people challenged the capacity of the Nationalist government to rule China. Some foreign ministers in Beijing even proclaimed that it was extremely unlikely that any of the foreign powers would consider shifting their legations to Nanjing "until a sufficient time should have elapsed to prove that the Republican regime was at last stabilized and not likely to either be defeated by some warlord adventurers or suddenly decide to shift from Nanjing to Wuhan, Guangzhou, or elsewhere" (Impev 1928, 233 
City Construction as a Political Statement
Although the Nationalist government was determined to install the capital at Nanjing, the poor cityscape of Nanjing did not match its historical glory and new capital status. The city was penetrated by dark and narrow roads and filled with dilapidated houses and shanties. People squatted randomly on streets, bridges, and in other public spaces. A journalist of a popular magazine in Shanghai urged the Nationalist government to "improve the aesthetic quality" of Nanjing in order to "compete with famous cities in other parts of the word, such as Paris, London, Washington, etc.," so that China, after a long period of humiliation by foreign powers, could regain its prestige internationally (Z. Chen 1928, 36) .
It was common for Nationalist leaders and the Chinese media to compare Nanjing with other modern cities in the world. They desperately wanted Nanjing to overtake these cities.
Among all these foreign precedents, Turkey was the most relevant to China. Both nations came out of the ashes of imperial empire and went through a protracted war of independence. After founding a new republic in 1923, Turkish leaders rapidly set into motion a number of societal reforms to build a modernized and westernized nation-state. To create a strong political statement, they decided to build the new capital in a small town, Ankara, from the ground up to become a major city and cultural center. The planning of Ankara was regularly reported by the Chinese media, who demanded that China simulate Turkey and forge from the ruins of an imperial empire a thoroughly modern nation-state. Reconstructing Nanjing thus became an urgent task for China. Shirong, literally "the city's appearance," was a phrase commonly mentioned by Chinese leaders. They were concerned about the appearance of the capital, arguing that an aesthetic capital would help China gain prestige. They also believed that the task of creating a beautiful, rational capital could be achieved through modern city planning.
Modern city planning was imported to China around the mid-nineteenth century.
European nations imposed urban plans, usually featuring a grid plan for easy land management and land sale, to concessions and treaty ports, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Tianjin.
Large-scale urban planning, however, began in China only after 1896. The Qing court granted Image 1: The Ginling Girls' College in Nanjing, designed by Henry Murphy. Source: Photo taken by the author.
Like Henry Murphy, many architects in China attempted to invent a new building style that was both "Chinese" and "modern." "Sinicized" modern buildings could be seen in big cities like Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Nanjing starting in the 1920s. The most notable effort of this new architectural reinterpretation directly involving the Nationalist government was the construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum on the Purple Mountain of Nanjing after an architectural competition. The competition jury complimented the winning design by Lu Yanzhi, a returned architecture graduate from Cornell University and former assistant to Henry Murphy, as a modern design that "shows respect to traditional spatial order and ritual practices." Another important factor behind the selection, however, was the financial difficulty of the Nationalist government. As one of the judges pointed out, the construction cost of the winning design was the lowest among all those short-listed. 
Planning Nanjing: State Capacity in Making the Plan
Who Gets to Plan?
As soon as Nanjing was made the national capital in 1927, a question emerged: who was going to plan the new capital? The question was raised not because of a lack of competent planners in China, but because there were too many people who were interested in planning the new capital. Believing that this was none but the municipal government's job, in January 1928
Mayor He Minhun announced the Grand Capital Plan (shoudu da jihua) to reconstruct Nanjing into "a scientific (kexue hua), artistic (yishu hua), and garden-like (tianyuan hua) new city,"
turning the city into "the only metropolis in the East" and "a model city in the world" (He 1928 ).
Nevertheless, the plan was abandoned when Liu Jiwen, who had been educated in Japan and the United Kingdom, replaced He Minhun as mayor of Nanjing in July 1928.
Liu Jiwen was very keen on improving the municipal administration and city appearance of Nanjing. During his mayoral tenure, he also served as a member of the Reconstruction Commission (jianshe weiyuanhui), a central government organ in charge of planning and hereafter, the Expert Office). The Expert Office would operate for a temporary period of six months until a long-term committee was set up by the Nationalist government (Wang 2002, 137-143) . Sun Ke immediately recruited to the Expert Office four American consultants with whom he had worked in Guangzhou-Henry Murphy, Ernest Goodrich, Colonel Irving Moller, and Theodore McCrosky-"to avoid mistakes and to offer guidance" (SDJH 1929, preface When the agreed six-month period ended, the Nationalist government founded the National Capital Reconstruction Commission (shoudu jianshe weiyuanhui; hereafter, the Reconstruction Commission) on June 22, 1929 , to replace the Expert Office. 7 Sun Ke, however, pleaded for a deferment to dismiss the Expert Office and agreed to subordinate it to the Reconstruction Commission (Wang 2002, 202-206) .
Drawing the Plan
By the end of December 1929, the Expert Office submitted a comprehensive planning proposal, the Capital Plan (shoudu jihua), to the Reconstruction Commission. Lin Yimin, director of the Expert Office, claimed: "It will promote urban design to all cities in China. The influence will be massive!" (Lin 1929a which can be organized into four categories: zoning, transportation, infrastructure and public utilities, and laws and regulations for enforcement.
According to Lin Yimin, an urban plan is the use of "scientific methods" to plan and construct all things in the city (Lin 1929b, 3) . Although Lin never clearly explained the meaning of "scientific methods," a possible interpretation is the use of zoning as a basis of development control. Zoning helps to restructure a chaotic urban environment into segregated areas based on function, creating new rationality to understand the modern city.
In the Capital Plan, the Expert Office proposed a zoning plan and a corresponding zoning regulation to restrict land use, density, size of land plot, permissible building area, building height, and site coverage. The walled city was mainly reserved for residential zones, commercial zones, and the municipal administration zone. Outside the city wall, two industrial zones were planned on both sides of the Yangtze River, whereas the central administrative zone was located at the foot of the Purple Mountain. Furthermore, green parks occupied 14.4 percent of the city area, a ratio similar to that of Washington, D.C. and far outnumbering that of London and New
York.
Image 5: The zoning of Nanjing. Source: Redrawn based on SDJH 1929, figure 56.
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As Nanjing was the seat for both the Nationalist and the municipal governments, the Expert Office suggested locating them at separate sites. The municipal administration zone was planned at two locations (one for government offices and the other for cultural and recreational facilities) at the heart of Nanjing for easy accessibility. By contrast, the central administrative zone was planned outside the city wall boundary, at the foot of the Purple Mountain in close proximity to two national monuments, the historical tomb of the first Ming emperor and the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. Citing Canberra in Australia, Ankara in Turkey, and New Delhi in India as precedents, Lin Yimin argued that it would offer greater flexibility to plan the central administrative zone on the outskirts of Nanjing, where adequate land could be acquired for the 77,580-acre zone-bigger than the National Mall in Washington, D.C.-to accommodate an anticipated staff population of 100,000 (Lin 1929a ). The American consultant Henry Murphy had designed a plan for the central administrative zone in June 1929, but it was not adopted by the Expert Office (Cody 2001, 186-187) . A month later, the Expert Office organized an international planning competition for the central administrative zone and invited Henry Murphy, the German planner Heinrich Schubart, and five other local and foreign experts to be judges. 8 The competition requirement explicitly asked for a Chinese design, which, to judges like Henry Murphy, was the key selection criterion.
The competition received nine submissions from four Chinese teams. Nevertheless, according to the judges' opinions, none of the submissions deserved the top and second prizes. In the end, they only awarded two third prizes and two fourth prizes.
One of the third-prize awards was reported in the Capital Plan, although there was no indication that the Expert Office was planning to adopt that plan. Designed by Huang Yuyu and Zhu Shenkang, the plan was strikingly similar to the National Mall in Washington, D.C. It Murphy especially disapproved of the absence of accent buildings at the intersections of the diagonal boulevards. Overall, most of the judges criticized that the design ran far over the 6 million yuan budget set by the Expert Office. 9 Although the planning of the central administrative zone was not confirmed in the Capital Plan, the Expert Office demanded that all government buildings subscribe to Chinese style, so that "the nation's valuable architectural tradition could be continued" (SDJH 1929, 33 The Capital Plan laid great emphasis on infrastructure development, reflecting the strong engineering background of the Expert Office. The old piers at the Yangtze River would be developed into a modern port, and the capital would have two train terminals and four airports.
In addition, the Capital Plan devoted lengthy sections to public utilities, covering topics such as electricity, streetlights, drinking water, drainage, and sewage (SDJH 1929, 63-64) .
Image 14: Image showing the future of Nanjing. Source: SDJH 1929, figure 44.
Building Nanjing: State Capacity in Implementing the Plan
After submitting the Capital Plan in December 1929, the Expert Office was officially dismissed and the job to reconstruct Nanjing was passed over to the Reconstruction Commission.
Chiang Kai-shek was the chairman of the standing committee, while Liu Jiwen became the general secretary. Sun Ke remained a member of the standing committee and the head of the Construction Office (gongchengzu), the executive arm of the Reconstruction Commission. The new leadership recruited a new consultant, Heinrich Schubart from Germany. 10 The change of planning power meant that some of the planning decisions made by the Expert Office were now subject to review by the Reconstruction Commission. In this section, I look at how three 
Contradiction between the Ideal Plan and the Social Problems
The capital status and vigorous urban development in Nanjing had attracted a huge number of people who sought new opportunities and developments. The year after Nanjing became the capital, the population increased from 360,500 to 497,526, as much as a 38 percent increase (J. Chen 1937, 29 Chen 1977, 47841-47844) . It became more and more difficult, and more and more expensive, to acquire accommodations in Nanjing.
Those who could not afford the high rent in Nanjing resorted to living in shanties. Most shantytowns in Nanjing were built in the southwest, which was historically the busiest part of the city; in the northwest, where docks and factories were concentrated; and along railway lines and major roads. The number of shanty families grew at a fast pace once Nanjing acquired its capital status. In 1928, shanty families represented almost 20 percent of the city's total household number (J. Chen 1937, 28) . By September 1936, 61,273 families (259,282 people), a quarter of the city's population, were living in shanties. Among them, over 181,000 lived inside the city wall. 17 To many Nationalist leaders, the shanties were the eyesores of Nanjing; they did not match the image of the new capital the leaders were seeking to create. State publications often stated that shantytowns in Nanjing were "disgustingly dirty, uninhabitable, and were the sources of disease and moral depravity" (Nanjing shizhengfu 1935, 2).
The Capital Plan intended to provide a framework to regulate the housing development of Nanjing. Three grades of residential zones were planned for detached houses, low-density multifamily houses, and medium-density multifamily houses, respectively. Nevertheless, the Nanjing municipal government only managed to develop a small portion of Residential Zone One, which it later renamed the New Residential Area (xin zhuzhaiqu). In the end, the project was carried out at a slow pace and only a small portion of the area, approximately 400 mu (266,667 square meters), was developed. This area was supplied with modern utilities like electricity, underground drainage and sewage, and streetlights. Public facilities, including a management office, markets, small parks, a playground, clinic, school, and police office, were planned at the junctions of main roads. All the land plots were opened for public purchasing.
Only Western-style luxury houses were permitted to be constructed in the area. These houses were usually two to three stories high, constructed in brick and concrete, and equipped with constructed for the common people, in particular those residents evicted for the construction of public works. Although the government claimed that the commoners' housing was constructed to "relieve the economic distress of the working class," it also stressed the importance of the common people in keeping up appearance of the capital (Nanjing shizhengfu 1935, 1) . Therefore, the Public Works Bureau imposed regular plans on these housing areas. Uniform single-story houses, which were subdivided into multiple residential units, were selected by the bureau for cost reasons. These paiwu (literally "row houses"), which were named because of their linear form, were aligned in an orderly manner. They were built with a timber structure, pitched roof,
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and brick wall enclosure. Communal facilities, such as public lavatories, schools, and drainage systems, were also planned in the areas (Nanjing shizhengfu 1935, 6-8) . Unfortunately, most of these Commoners' Residential Areas were located outside the city wall. As it turned out, not many people were willing to move into these remote settlements, which were far away from where jobs were available. The second type of lower-class housing was developed for shanty dwellers as instructed by the Nationalist government. The municipal government planned nine Shanty Residential Areas outside the city wall boundary of Nanjing. Nevertheless, the municipal government admitted that it did not have the financial capacity to build houses to accommodate the shanty population. As such, the municipal Public Works Bureau had only provided the Shanty
18
Residential Areas with basic sanitation, public utilities, and communal facilities, such as a school, clinic, police station, fire station, and lavatory. The tenant families were given empty plots in the area and had to rebuild their shacks in accordance with an official design. The shacks were made of low-cost materials, like mud walls, bamboo wattle, mud floors, and straw-mat roofs. Basically, they were still shanty structures, but built in a uniform design and arranged in an orderly, unified manner. The tenant families did not need to pay any rent. However, when they moved from the area, they had to return the land to the government and sell the shack to the next tenant at a price determined by the government (Nanjing shizhengfu 1935, 3-4) . In the original plan, the nine projects would accommodate 3,520 families. By October 1935, however, only three areas were completed. In one of the areas, a visitor found that over one thousand shanty families had already moved in, but the Public Works Bureau had yet to build any public facilities like street lamps, water wells, and lavatories. Image 23: Planning of one of the Shanty Residential Areas in Nanjing. Source: Nanjing shizhengfu 1935, no page number.
The Capital Road Network: The Antipathy of Local Residents
The construction of new roads and the widening of streets were the most extensive public works that had been carried out in Nanjing. Most of the works involved land requisition, causing many families in Nanjing to lose their homes. For instance, the construction of the long Zhongshan Avenue, which cut across the busiest part of Nanjing and deviated significantly from (Feng 1975, 17) . there were a total of 141 cases of land requisition along Zhongshan Avenue for the development of various kinds of public works. The record shows that the construction of public buildings and the development of traffic and communications were the major reasons behind the requisition; they equaled 39 and 30.5 percent of the total cases respectively. In other cases, however, the requisitions were hard to justify. The Expert Office, for instance, criticized the random requisition of private land by some ministries and government agencies for the construction of employee dormitories, which the Expert Office claimed should not be considered public works.
Some of these agencies had also failed to compensate the affected landowners. Sun Ke had repeatedly pleaded the Nationalist government to seriously look into these cases. The extensive reconstruction of Nanjing also imposed a heavy financial burden on the government. Nationalist leaders believed that capital reconstruction was a national matter that required support from every province, city, and citizen. Therefore, in the summer of 1929, the municipal government issued a bond valued at 50 million yuan to raise funds for public works.
24
30 million yuan of the bond was opened for public purchasing, while the remaining 20 million yuan was allocated among twenty-five provinces in China, which were classified into six grades based on their annual incomes. 25 In return, new roads in Nanjing were named after these provinces.
Nationalist leaders also believed that Nanjing residents should share the financial burden of public works. Speaking at the first meeting of the Reconstruction Commission, Kong Xiangxi claimed that because landowners would benefit from the completion of road works, they "should also share some obligations" (X. Liu 1977, 94683) . Citing New York and Chicago as examples, Kong Xiangxi suggested imposing a construction levy (tanfei) on them. (X. Liu 1977, 49683) Since August 1930, the municipal government had adopted the Nanjing Road Construction Cost Sharing Temporary Regulation (Nanjing Shi zhulu tanfei zanhang guize) to both the construction of new roads and the widening of streets. The policy was later expanded to other public works as well. 26 Because of the levy, the financial burden of public works was transferred from the government to the people. In some cases, the levy one had to pay might be more than the compensation one received. Many landowners, therefore, petitioned to the state against the high levy, which had prevented them from developing their properties. One petitioner commented that no one wanted to buy land in Nanjing and paid the high levy. 27 This defeated the state's original intention to beautify Nanjing and to promote urban development.
Conclusion
Despite unfavorable social, economic, and political circumstances, leaders of the Nationalist state vowed to reconstruct Nanjing into a modern capital that was more prosperous than London, Paris, or New York. By moving the capital from Beijing to Nanjing, they wanted to free China from the shadow of the Manchus, foreign powers, and northern warlords. They also believed that a new and modern capital could be a source of political legitimacy, showing that the Nationalist state had the capacity to reconstruct the war-torn capital Nanjing and, by extension, China. They often compared Nanjing to its foreign counterparts, never hiding their ambition to enter China into a worldwide competition to construct metropolitan cities of international standard.
The reconstruction of Nanjing, however, faced several setbacks. In evaluating the state capacity of Republican China, we must bear in mind that the modern state consists, politically, of a group of political actors, factions, and communities with diverse backgrounds and interests, and, administratively, of a complex hierarchy of governmental structures. As such, one important measure of a state's capacity is whether it has the ability to achieve its goals despite the presence of political differences and administrative constraints. In this sense, the state's capacity with regard to city planning concerns its ability to generate unified planning ideas during the planning process, and its ability to turn those ideas into practice during the implementation process.
The Nanjing planning process came hand in hand with a power battle between various camps within the Nationalist government about who should plan the capital. The job was first given to Sun Ke, who subsequently pulled together a committed, competent, and experienced team of planners and engineers. Their commitment was shown by their great effort in developing the Capital Plan, the most comprehensive planning proposal ever made for a Chinese city. Their competence was demonstrated by their broad coverage of topics in the Capital Plan, evident understanding of the most updated concepts and theories in planning and engineering, and knowledge to develop associated planning laws and regulations. This team had a clear vision for the future of Nanjing. The Nationalist planners had the technological capacity to generate an urban plan that was up to international standards, as well as the symbolic capacity to invest the plan with a new nationalism and modernity.
While these planning ideals were lofty, reality diverged from these ideals after the dismissal of the Expert Office. Some planning decisions made in the Capital Plan were ministries and government agencies simply constructed their buildings randomly all over Nanjing.
After the dismissal of the Expert Office, the actual reconstruction of Nanjing relied mainly on the municipal government and its Public Works Bureau. Although the municipal government shared similar ideas with the Expert Office in building an orderly, aesthetic, and sanitary Nanjing, it also had other pragmatic concerns. The real challenge for the municipal government was not the technical side of the reconstruction, but Nanging's many social problems, most notably the presence of a huge population that was living in poverty. The implementation of the residential zones under the Capital Plan-or rather the lack of itreflected the priorities of the municipal government. With limited resources, the municipal government opted to invest in upper-class residential areas and relocate the poorer classes outside of the walled city at little expense.
The lack of financial capacity made the reconstruction of Nanjing difficult. The ambitious road works rendered many local residents homeless. Their antipathy deepened as the government imposed construction levies on them in order to finance the road works. This policy showed the lack of responsive capacity to cater for the needs, concerns, and sentiments of the people. This reflected the great conflict between the state's wish for a grandiose capital and the common people's concerns for their livelihoods-a deep split between the dream from above and the reality from the ground.
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Notes 1 In the first half of 1928, the Wuhan faction suffered from internal fragmentation and decided to part with the Communists. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek's troops were defeated by the warlord army when he attempted to push the Northern Expedition toward Beijing. After the defeat, a new coalition was formed within the Nanjing faction, and Chiang Kai-shek was forced out of power. The Wuhan and Nanjing factions agreed to establish a new, unified Nationalist government at Nanjing. Nevertheless, without the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist government was virtually impotent to resume the Northern Expedition. Therefore, in the summer of 1928, Chiang Kai-shek returned to Nanjing more powerful than before. See Eastman 1991 . 2 See Anonymous 1928a 
